

## China-India Relations: A Critical Analysis of Convergence and Divergence

Dr. Imran Khan<sup>1</sup> Muhammad Usman Shamim<sup>2</sup>

1. Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Okara, Punjab, Pakistan  
imran.khan@uo.edu.pk
2. Lecturer, Department of Political Science, University of Okara, Punjab, Pakistan.

### Abstract

*Relations between India and China are getting more and more tangled as both are the largest and fastest rising nations in Asia in today's global politics. This relationship is characterized by obvious similarities, such as a shared culture, a shared goal to once again dominate international relations and shared modernization objectives. Relationships can also be plagued with a several problems, most remarkably long-lasting regional conflicts, disagreements over local dominance and more generalized ambassadorial problems notably pertaining to relationships between India and China. As a result, it is possible to compare India-China relations on economic and military grounds where certain aspects of their connection have seen as taking both advantages and disadvantages at the same time. This paper examines the origins and current manifestation of such a fundamental dynamic in the interactions between New Delhi and Beijing over the past 75 years and shows how their strategic objectives are frequently both converging and diverging.*

**Key Words:** Convergence, Diplomatic Issues, Divergence, Economy, Strategic Issues

### Introduction

Relations between India and China are getting more and more entwined as the largest and fastest-rising nations in Asia in today's global politics. This symbiosis is characterized by a number of distinct commonalities, including a communal historic perception of both countries as main civilizations of universal significance and a shared craving among their peoples and leaders to regain their position as major influencers in the global structure (Ogden, 2017; Muzaffar, et. al. 2018). Such common heritages and outlooks are further supported by joint past involvements of extremely detrimental foreign involvements by Western authorities (Zhu, 2011), as well as by India and China's current possession of some of the foremost demographic, economic, territorial, and military capabilities in the world. Adherence to modernization and development strategies unites the two organizations, making reaching higher points of regional, bilateral, and international commerce a shared goal and effectively enhancing their strength in all spheres of international affairs (Zhu, 2011).

Given the speed at which their economies have grown over the past few decades (although Beijing's performance has been longer and quicker than New Delhi), both countries are nowadays playing a larger role in world diplomacy than they ever have. In matters reaching from how both China and India, as developing governments, are successfully handle the environment issues to acquiring further represented speeches in current and innovative global organizations, there is a growing trend toward expressing comparable stresses in the expression of parallel difficulties. These viewpoints are supported by persistent and lingering doubts about the motivations driving the hegemony of US, which are themselves strengthened by a common commitment to creating a global arrangement based on multipolarity rather than solely US-led unipolarity (Pant, 2011). The conviction that the twenty-first century would be known as the Asian Century, with the Asian sphere serving as the crucial fulcrum of international politics, and the maintenance of a peaceful and safe Asian sphere supporting both their basic interests, dominates these commonalities (Muzaffar & Khan, 2016; Ogden, 2022; Muzaffar, et. al 2017).

Despite these significant positive commonalities, there are a number of unfavorable aspects to relations between India and China. Their crucial proximity—both physically and in regards to their political objectives—often makes such confrontations worse. The War of 1962 and the current incidents

in Galwan, which caused the casualties in both states, are examples of historical and more recent confrontations that have worsened the territorial disputes between Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh. In a broader sense, analysts have seen a battle for hegemony, power, and influence between the two sides that penetrates Beijing's and New Delhi's shared quest for energy security and regional trade (Scott, 2008).

This self-motivated also affects each state's bilateral connections with other nations in the Indo-Pacific, East Asia, South East Asia, and South Asia, with the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) taking center stage. Here, New Delhi is most concerned about China's tight relations to Pakistan, while Beijing is most concerned about India's growing relations to the US (as well as Russia, Japan and Australia). The latter is particularly important since it relates to the dynamics of the Asian balance of power and determines whether state will be able to assert hegemony and leadership over East Asia, South Asia, and the larger Asian area as an entire or be prevented from doing so. The fact that both regimes are accumulating increasingly potent military assets through coordinated modernization initiatives only helps to exacerbate the situation (Muzaffar & Khan, 2021; Ogden, 2022).

As a result, it is possible to think of India-China relations as having a growing nexus where certain aspects of their relationship may be perceived as having both advantages and disadvantages at the same time. Given that both nations are advancing to ever-greater international standing, as well as the scope of their worldwide interests. The extent and magnitude of those advantages and obligations are accruing continuously in landscape. Internationally, further realism thoughtfulness their interactions as a typical illustration of a security problem, with many tactical moves made by each side being immediately reversed by the other always perceived as a danger to the interests of others (Pant, 2011). Equally, more constructivism thinking would pursue to emphasize how common goals and objectives, moreover anxieties and threats, are the invention of anthropological activity of community building which can give India-China relations a way to disengage from the security conundrum and concentrate on win-win outcomes (Hopf, 1998). These common social practices and their emotional effects, which have historical roots but are also ingrained in modern contact, can be used to understand state alliances and rivalries (Pardesi, 2010).

Based on this, we may utilize security risk observation as a valuable and important path to analyze and comprehend ties between Beijing and New Delhi. Threat perceptions is defined as the “anticipation of harm to either one's material assets or belief systems” (Baldwin,1971), are formed by past contacts between nations and serve as the foundation for hypotheses about how players would conduct in specific circumstances. In this way, ancient hostility, conflicts, and rivalries recurrently foster a climate of mistrust and aggression for current relationships, escalating professed fears (Singer, 1958). This is unquestionably true of China-India kindred in light of the 1962 War's inheritance moreover other reminiscences of hostility and fight. This emphasizes how “even the potential of huge complete advantages for both countries do not provoke their collaboration so extensive as one worries how the other may utilize its greater skills” that overcoming such negativities is essential to fostering effective relationships (Waltz, 1978). In this view, the good side of the competition must win over its immoral side for supportive relations between Beijing and New Delhi to flourish. Thus, preserving a cooperation based on shared defense, political, and economic objectives will be necessary over time (Naidu, 2008).

This paper goes in the following way as it analyses such dynamics using these helpful heuristic tools. It begins by outlining the development of India-China ties historically during the last 75 years, from the time of their inauguration as contemporary countries in the late 1940s to the present. The study then examines the key elements of recent New Delhi-Beijing interactions by using this progression as an analytical compass. Here, we specifically analyze the interactions between the two countries in light of a wide range of variables before coming to a customary of assumptions that assess the facts of convergence and divergence in China-India relations and relevantly address the question of whether good or bad relations are currently in the influential (Muzaffar & Khan, 2021; Ogden, 2022).

## The Foundation of Historical Events

Following similar, unfavorable colonial experiences on both sides, contemporary India emerged in 1947, and later, the People's Republic of China (PRC) emerged as modern China in 1949. Both countries were fragile and poor in terms of resources when they first assumed their current forms, despite having somewhat different histories. As a result, both China and India confronted significant political, social, and developmental problems in the years immediately following the Second World War (Tellis, 2004). Additionally, the activities of outside players had caused both groups of their governing leaders to lose a significant degree of prestige, which fueled ingrained anti-colonial and anti-imperialist feelings in Beijing and New Delhi. Such a similar involvement and shared danger insight strengthened the likelihood of a firm association between these two nations, evidencing a strong fear and skepticism of the international system and its builders (Sidhu & Yuan, 2003).

India was the first non-socialist nation to create ambassadorial connections with communist China on this basis during the early years of their contemporary relationships, and in contradiction of the nascent bipolar politics of the Cold War (Ogden, 2014). Both the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai paid state visits to their respective countries in 1954. These trips were marked by a spirit of cooperation, camaraderie, and hope (Sidhu & Yuan, 2003). Additionally, both governments came to the realization that working together may help them better withstand the foreign great powers' schemes and promote more stability throughout the larger Asian area. The phrase "Chini-Hindi bhai bhai" literally, "Chinese and Indians are brothers", which reflects these sentiments, was frequently uttered by representatives of both countries (Fang, 2013).

Both countries are willing to admiration for each other's regional veracity and sovereignty, captures shared fears of being invaded once more. This was supported by the principle of non-aggression, which forbade the practice of armed actions in international relations, and the other principle of non-interference in internal matters, which determinedly emphasized the necessity to maintain independence and autonomy from outside impact. These maxims were reaffirmed by some of the other principles such as impartiality, peaceful coexistence and joint benefits with equality (Ogden, 2022).

Despite this initial optimism and some successful agreements over the contentious areas of their shared borders. As a result, Beijing started to see New Delhi as a possible challenge to its position as the leader of the developing countries, particularly in light of India's significant contribution to the Non-Aligned Movement. As evidenced by the five principles of peaceful coexistence, both sides had a similar worldview, but this similarity also brought inherent difficulties about how each country might positively follow its key strategic goals. According to our double-edged sword metaphor, what at first looked to be agreements later turned into conflicts, and vice versa (Ogden, 2022).

Chinese invasions into Ladakh in 1959 served as preludes to the China-India War, which was primarily motivated by territorial disputes with Arunachal Pradesh, Aksai Chin, and Tibet. The 1962 War weakened Nehru's dreams of supremacy and resulted the humiliating loss of India within one month, and left the boundary dispute virtually unsolved (Guha, 2012). It also left an apparently irreparable mental blemish and deep-rooted mistrust towards China. Additionally, it caused India to abandon its prior belief that it would advance in local and international matters resulting in a more pronounced and long-lasting militarization of India (Garver, 2004; Huchet, 2008).

As a result of the 1962 setback, India's defense spending increased significantly as New Delhi realized the importance of armed safekeeping concerns. In the late 1990s, this led to the country's purchase of nuclear weapons (Perkovich, 2004). China's subsequent decision to forge an enduring strategic relationship with Pakistan with whom India shared South Asian territory, leadership, and status disputes—only served to confirm this course and increase Indian perceptions of China as a danger (Ogden, 2014). The China-Pakistan partnership would entail Beijing bolstering Pakistan's defense capabilities, supporting the Pakistani military, and offering diplomatic support in respect to the Kashmir conflict (Garver, 2004).

After a "Statement of Friendship" in May 1970, full diplomatic ties weren't established again until July 1976. Slow efforts were subsequently taken to normalize ties, including a joint communiqué in May 1980 that called for the introduction of hotlines, in-person commander meetings, and advance notice of military drills in order to prevent repeated border conflicts. Premier Zhao Ziyang and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi met in October 1985, and the former paid his first head of state visit from India in 34 years to China in 1988 (Ogden, 2022).

The collaboration was further strengthened with the visit of Jiang Zemin to India in 1996, the first visit of a Chinese Premier to India since 1962. As a result, more actions to ease border tensions, such as fewer perambulations and the elimination of significant military arrangements were taken. This improvement in India-China relations persisted after a brief deterioration subsequent nuclear missile tests of India in May 1998. Premier Atal Bihari Vajpayee wrote to Bill Clinton, who was president of the United States at the time, expressing, "We have an overt nuclear weapon state on our border, a state that committed armed aggression against India in 1962" (Vajpayee, 1998; Ogden, 2014).

Following the visit of Indian President K. R. Narayanan in June 2000, discussions on borders, the economy, and science also resumed. The culmination of these constructive ties was the signing of the "Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation" in 2003, which helped both parties by forging agreement on a number of bilateral, regional, and international problems. Trade between India and China rose from \$3 billion in 2000 to \$74 billion in 2011, highlighting this strengthening of connections and pointing to growing degrees of economic dependency. Both sides also engaged in competitive bidding for a number of oil contracts underscoring their shared efforts to ensure their energy security (Ogden, 2014). Beijing and New Delhi both recognized that they needed to be acknowledged as economic superpowers on both the domestic and international levels in command to gain authority as world power (Rusko & Sasikumar, 2007).

A unified global economic strategy was articulated in the 2008 "Shared Vision for the Twenty-First Century" statement in terms of diplomacy, and it included collaborative action in international forums on global environmental issues and on civil nuclear energy cooperation. Additionally, the two parties contributed to the formation of the BRICS gathering in 2009, which focused on common objectives for a more equitable and multipolar international order (Cooper & Farooq, 2016). In 2012, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang said that China-India relations were the utmost significant mutual partnership in the 21st century, relations overall seemed to be in a golden age (Ogden, 2014).

### **The Shape of Modern Relationships on Economic Grounds**

India and China both seem to be fully emerging or poised to become big powers in the past ten years. Since the 1940s, obtaining—and even reestablishing—such a position was a long-sought goal for both Beijing and New Delhi since it is a major energetic within the external strategy objectives of both governments (Ogden, 2017). Their significance to the international system was and continues to be growing due to their expanding economic power shares, rising military spending, greatest populations on earth, and two of the major governments in the globe in rappings of territory. Regarding the first of these metrics, in 2020 China's gross domestic product (GDP) was \$24.27 trillion and India's was \$8.97 trillion, making them the first and third highest in the world and accounting for 18.3 percent and 6.8 percent of global GDP, respectively (World Bank, 2022). The second and third greatest military expenditures worldwide in 2020, respectively, were made by India (\$72.9 billion) and China (\$252.3 billion). As a result, China and India are becoming increasingly important to other powerful nations in the global arrangement, notably the US, whose dominant spot seems to be in jeopardy due to a quickly developing China (World Bank, 2022).

A robust economy with a global focus confers possible larger components of interdependence and authority within the global arrangement but also provides the cautiously dominant nations a structure-determining primacy, according to the core thesis (Ogden, 2017). It has been widely anticipated over the past ten years that India and China will naturally complement one another, with the previous serving as the "back office of the world" and the latter as the "workshop of the world" (Huchet,

2008). The Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji endorsed both the countries unstoppable on a global scale. As a result, despite other points of contention between them, China-India economic links was seen as foremost key foundations of the India-China rapprochement that occurred in the end of twentieth century (Pant, 2011).

Intra-Indian trade between China and India touched a record \$125 billion in 2021, a 43.3 percent increase from 2020. This was indicative of the importance of the relationship, and despite the protracted standoff between their two forces in Eastern Ladakh that culminated in the Galwan fight in 2020 (The Economic Times, 2022). Notably, since 2011, when they occasionally exhibited less-than-exponential growth, such unique spikes have not characterized economic relationships. Since 2009, China has become India's top importer, highlighting the degree of this dependency. China was India's main trading partner in 2020, accounting for 13.8% of all imports, ahead of the US (7.6%) (Statista, 2021). During the COVID-19 epidemic, India likewise relied on Chinese technology and supplies with Beijing's superior technical know-how surpassing that of New Delhi (Patranobis, 2021).

Importantly, this status is not shared by China's imports from India, which has led to a system of substantially unbalanced economic ties and a \$69 billion trade deficit between the two countries in 2021 (The Economic Times, 2022). Such an imbalance casts doubt on broader normative assumptions about shared growth and the alleged "win-win" foundation of such relationships, which today favor China more than India.

As a component of China's larger Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), India has struggled linking the RCEP out of concern that it will pass through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, theoretically undermining India's broader entitlements to the area while simultaneously enhancing Pakistan and allowing for the construction of roads that could be used by militants to enter Indian territory. More importantly, they share comparable underlying concerns even though they may be in different phases of development as two governments that are now liberalizing their economies and striving to become fully fledged actors in international affairs. In terms of how companies and professionals perceive the public sector to be corrupt, China and India were rated together 80th position in "Corruption Perceptions Index 2019" (Transparency International, 2019). As a result of largely unchecked and inadequately managed economic liberalization policies, both states are now experiencing extensive environmental contamination.

As a consequence, China produced 26.5 percent of the world's CO2 emissions in 2018 while India produced 6.6 percent, ranking first and third, respectively, in terms of state-level emissions (Climate Watch, 2021). In India and China, air pollution contributed to 1.6 million fatalities in 2017, and in 2020, India and China together accounted for 46 of the 100 most polluted cities in the world, with India accounting for nine of the top ten most polluted cities (Duggal, 2021). Thus, both governments are interested in finding solutions to these problems, and they may cooperate in international frameworks and learn from one another in the process. These interactions balance the less favorable aspects of their complex economic relationships (Ogden, 2022).

### **The Shape of Modern Relationships on Military Grounds**

The pace of military investment on either side has increased along with both sides' economic prosperities. This spending has frequently been utilized to supplement each side's needs for commerce, energy, and territorial security. Additionally, military modernization of China and growing regional aggressiveness are seen from India's perspective as being directly related to its financial liberalization and the significant comparative advantages Beijing enjoys over other governments (Pant & Joshi, 2015). Due to its factually greater rates of economic growth, China has been able to expand extensively more than its allies, including India, thanks to these relative benefits. Additionally, there are joint training aerobics for anti-piracy in order to reduce risks to energy and commerce security in the IOR and support their sustained economic growth. Initiated in 2007, their shared armed workout "Exercise Hand-in-Hand" has had eight incarnations with both countries hosting the occasion, with the most recent one being in 2019. While there is mutually beneficial overlap between both groups of interests, their

territorially exclusive objectives have led to conflict. This conflict has gained more prominence in recent years as a result of India's and China's conflicting entitlements to the undecided regions of Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh.

These conflicts, which are hampered by ill-defined boundaries and frequent Chinese intrusions, hinge on reestablishing the territorial integrity of each side. According to New Delhi, the conflict poses a larger security danger to India than to China because, if Beijing were to gain authority of Arunachal Pradesh, it would allow China to expand its influence across the Himalayas and into unreliable north-eastern provinces of India (Fang, 2013). The current military standoff in Doklam in 2017 and the tragic confrontations in Galwan in 2020, which supplementary highlighted an experiential aspect in the joint danger assessments of both parties, are examples of these risk discernments and the dispute's inherent zero-sum character.

Both sides' more outspoken nationalist attitudes are contributing to rising tensions, as are internal calls for forceful, militarily supported reactions in the case of any perceived invasions. Further (perhaps fatal) military clashes between the two countries are not improbable in the upcoming given that India still views China with "deep mistrust" (Scott, 2008). The ongoing development of both sides' militaries, which includes China is working on supersonic missile technology, and in late 2021, India also tested a "China-centric" variant of the Agni V, as well as by jointly developing guided missile submarines and destroyers, both sides' perceptions of the danger are heightened. China's regional security is impacted by India's sale of armaments to the Vietnam and Philippines, while US advancements are being sparked by Beijing's developments (Scott, 2021; Yaseen, et. al. 2016).

Both countries acknowledged, during the visit of Modi to China in 2015 that their "simultaneous re-emergence... as two major powers in the region and the globe, presents a monumental opportunity for (the) realization of the Asian Century" (MEA, 2015). India's participation in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and its full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which Modi viewed as "a logical extension of India's age-old ties with the region" and "will help us build a region which is an engine of economic growth for the world and is more stable," are emblematic of these sentiments. India's relations with the SCO includes cooperative military drills, the most recent of which took place in late 2021, even though they occurred around the same time as the Quad's "Malabar 21" drills (Ogden, 2022).

## **Conclusion**

India-China relations are plagued by a complex and ever-evolving ratio of interests that over time have converged and diverged, as has been evident during the course of their 75-year history of international engagement with one another. In areas focused on settling territorial conflicts favorably, reaching establishing unchallenged regional hegemony and taking the helm of the Asian Century, India and China seem driven together because of these strategic overlaps in aims and interests into conflict with one another conflict precedents and prior experience—most. The violent conflicts at Galwan in 2020 clearly emphasize this sense of threat. which substantial and ongoing material progressively intensifies, adding to their own intensity both entities accumulating power.

It seems challenging to find a course of action that avoids such concurrent convergence and divergence. Particularly since the start of China's BRI, regional influence competition has increased. As a result, cooperation between the two sides on important global issues like climate change, the nature of the global trading system, sovereignty issues, and humanitarian interventions, among others, has waned. As a result of this observation, other tensions between the two giants are exacerbated, which tilts their current relationships toward the unfavorable side of the double-edged sword. However, it would necessitate compromises from both sides, which are now challenging to achieve given the sometimes nationalist-fueled hostilities between the two factions. Greater regional forces, most notably the ongoing all-weather relations between Beijing and Islamabad, and New Delhi's obvious and deepening strategic recent tilt towards Washington would also seem to partly weigh against forging such a strategic route. Such efforts become increasingly necessary and significant at an era when

populism and nationalism are driving international relations, and there are two forceful and self-assured leaders in the personas of Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping.

Increased collaboration in these areas can also contribute to a stronger sense of India and China's shared interdependence, understanding, and destiny. These linkages will be helpful during times of stress and potential conflict. It would be beneficial to accept strategic complexity rather than anticipate strategic simplicity and to keep in mind the crucial role of pragmatism in contemporary Indian foreign policy. As a result, even while it too suffers from the bad impacts of imbalanced and unequal trade with Beijing, New Delhi may profit from obtaining beneficial collaboration on issues like climate change and social governance/corruption. In addition, even though China continues to be Pakistan's strongest ally, India and China can cooperate militarily in some areas, such as the fight against cross-border wrongdoings like drug trafficking and the penetration of radical clusters. In the end, it will also support China's aspirations to become a great power and India's realization of the Asian Century individually and together.

## References

- Baldwin, D. A. (1971). Thinking about threat. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 15(1), 71–78.
- Climate Watch. (2021). Historical GHG emissions. *World Resources Institution*.  
<https://www.wri.org/initiatives/climate-watch>
- Cooper, A. F., & Farooq, A. B. (2016). The role of China and India in the G20 and BRICS: Commonalities or competitive behaviour? *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs*, 45(3), 73–106.
- Duggal, H. (2021, November 22). Infographic: The 100 most polluted cities in the world. *Al-Jazeera*.  
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/22/infographic-the-worlds-100-most-polluted-cities>
- Fang, T. (2013). *Asymmetrical threat perceptions in India–China relations*. Oxford University Press.
- Garver, J. W. (2004b). India, China, the United States, Tibet, and the origins of the 1962 war. *India Review*, 3(2), 9–20.
- Guha, K. (2012). Sino-Indian relations: History, problems and prospects. *Harvard International Review*, 34(2), 26–29.
- Hopf, T. (1998). The promise of constructivism in international relations theory. *International Security*, 23(1), 171–200.
- Huchet, J. (2008). Between geostrategic rivalry and economic competition: Emergence of a pragmatic India–China relationship. *China Perspectives*, 3, 50–67.
- Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). (2015, May 15). *Joint statement between India and China during prime minister's visit to China*.<http://mea.gov.in/bilateraldocuments>.
- Muzaffar, M., & Khan, I. (2016). China-Russia Relations after the Cold War. *Orient Research Journal of Social Sciences*, 1, 151-169.
- Muzaffar, M., & Khan, I. (2021). China's Foreign Policy and Strategic Stability towards South Asia: An Analysis. *South Asian Studies* 36(2). 339-350
- Muzaffar, M., Yaseen, N., & Rahim, N. (2017). Changing Dynamics of Global Politics: Transition from Unipolar to Multipolar World, *LASSIJ Liberal Arts and Social Sciences International Journal*, I (I), 49-61
- Muzaffar, M., Shah, S. T. A., & Yaseen (2018). Pax Sinica in Asia: China's Emergent Geopolitics of Economic Corridors and Dream of Leadership, *Global Political Review*, III (I), 101-109
- Naidu, G. V. C. (2008, December 15–16). *India–Japan relations: Emerging contours of strategic partnership* [Paper presentation]. 10th IDSA-JIIA Bilateral Seminar, New Delhi.
- Ogden, C. (2014). *Indian foreign policy: Ambition and transition*. Polity Press.
- Ogden, C. (2017). *China and India: Asia's emergent great powers*. Polity Press.
- Ogden, C. (2022). The Double-Edged Sword: Reviewing India–China Relations. *India Quarterly*, 09749284221089530.
- Pant, H. V. (2011). India's relations with China. In D. Scott (Ed.), *Handbook of India's international relations* (pp. 233–242). London.



- Pant, H., & Joshi, Y. (2015). *The US pivot and Indian foreign policy: Asia's evolving balance of power*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Pardesi, M. S. (2010). Understanding (changing) Chinese strategic perceptions of India. *Strategic Analysis*, 34(4), 562–578.
- Patranobis, S. (2021, May 8). Indian firms procuring over 60,000 oxygen concentrators from China. *Hindustan Times*
- Rusko, C., & Sasikumar, K. (2007). India and China: From trade to peace? *Asian Perspective*, 31(4), 99–123.
- Scott, D. (2008). The great power 'great game' between India and China: 'The logic of geography'. *Geopolitics*, 13(1), 1–26.
- Scott, D. (2021, January 12). *Missile race spirals between China and India* [China–India Brief #196]. <https://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/cag/publications/details/china-india-brief-196>
- Sidhu, W. P. S., & Yuan, J-D. (2003). *China and India: Cooperation or conflict?* Lynne Rienner.
- Singer, J. D. (1958). Threat perception and the armament-tension dilemma. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 2(1), 90–105.
- Statista. (2021, March 31). *Distribution of India's imports in financial year 2020*. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/650670/import-share-by-source-country-india/>
- Tellis, A. J. (2004). China and India in Asia. In F. R. Frankel & H. Harding (Eds.), *The India–China relationship: What the United States needs to know* (pp. 134–77). Columbia University Press.
- The Economic Times*. (2022). India–China trade grows to record \$125 billion in 2021 despite tensions in eastern Ladakh.
- Transparency International. (2019). *Corruption Perceptions Index 2019*. <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2019>
- Vajpayee, A. (1998, May 13). Nuclear anxiety: India's letter to Clinton on the nuclear testing. *New York Times*. <https://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/13/world/nuclear-anxietyindian-s-letter-to-clinton-on-the-nuclear-testing.html>
- Waltz, K. N. (1978). *Theory of international politics*. Waveland Press.
- World Bank. (2022). *GDP PPP constant \$s*. [https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.CD?most\\_recent\\_value\\_desc=true](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.CD?most_recent_value_desc=true)
- Yaseen, Z., Jathol, I., & Muzaffar, M. (2016). Pakistan and India Relations: A Political Analysis of Conflicts and Regional Security in South Asia, *Global Political Review*, 1 (I), 1-09
- Zhu, Z. (2011). China–India Relations in the 21st century: A critical inquiry. *Indian Journal of Asian Affairs*, 24(1), 1–16.