

Evolution of Religious Political Parties in Pakistan during Military Regimes

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Abstract

This Paper discusses the intricacies of civil-military relations to the trends of the religious political parties in Pakistan's strategy. Consequently, every diktator has always had the eye on religious political parties and vice versa. Each military regime's key objective in spreading the cause of Islam was related to its political compulsions. The Zia dictatorship, associated with Islam's state patronage, only strengthened the position of religious influence in politics. Musharraf, however, attempted to move beyond Zia's model, and look at the Ayub Khan era, but he helped the religious parties by adopting certificates issued from madrasahs (ijazahs) as higher school degrees in the name of optimizing the level of parliamentary member by thus removing many veterans. This paper ends with the remarks that Khaki-Mullah Nexus reveals a basic political party approach to extremism.

Key Words: Khaki-Mullah, Military Regimes, Nexus, Extremism, Political Engineering

Introduction

The religion has had tremendous influence on the lives of ordinary people in the less developing, developed and also developed communities particularly over the last 30 years. The revolution in Iran has found this religious growth and the religious identity of public life was detrimental to secularism and also needs the liberal religious position in the general life of the people, especially in the mainstream state politics.

Pakistan was built on Islam, so religion plays a major role in its political growth. This feature can be separated into two phases: pre-partition and post-partition stages. Islam was seen as a primary weapon for political mobilization in an effort to achieve a Muslim country in the pre-partition period. The attention of policymakers on the position of religion, however, declined dramatically after the achievement of the national aim of Statehood. Consequently, the leadership wanted a democratic country and the people wanted a Muslim republic, which created a clash of philosophies.

The government of the newly independent Pakistan was split into two opposition parties after Muhammad Ali Jinnah's death. Both parties have been requested that Pakistan's government should be in line with its official function with the most secular and liberal philosophy, and on the other hand, that Pakistan formally own the Islamic ideology and adopt the Nizam-i-Mustafa in Pakistan. It also requested that the first religious holy state of Madina follow Pakistan's leading model.

Few of the electronic dialect press and pastoral practice were mainly anti-progressive and neutralized by pioneers of liberalism. Then there has been religious oppression, threats, and hate, notwithstanding the vision of the founder, Father Muhammad Ali Jinnah.

Religious political parties must aim to achieve their goals by Pakistan's democracy. Their primary focus is on Islamic mass socialization and state rule founded on Islamic doctrine. In order to establish an ideological debate, religious politicians presented the first advantages facing the Islamic Movement with the analytical resolution of 1949. They said the "divine" law would be preferable to the laws that the Parliament has prepared and will also enact Sharia legislation in Zia-ul-Haq under the applicable constitutional recommendation (Riaz, 2010). Despite these significant victories, Islamic political parties also cause difficulties for the entire world by expelling Islamic doctrine. They also addressed religious socialization, which is tied to their political agendas. They are also important for their successes, and in the culture the movement of religious society becomes more and more notable. Religious zeal eventually strives in all aspects of life to introduce Islam. The six key factors: Islam politized, reform movements, Sufism, dawa and tableigh, militancy and sectarianism, preaching and embracing Islam. In most Islamic political parties and their political campaigns, these considerations also occur.

Under the Zia-ul-Haq dictatorship the Islamist view was enshrined in the State (1977-88). The military-dominated Zia government is affiliated with Islam and has only helped to restore political Islam. The period of Zia saw the Islamic law, public policy and western society establish a rare case of Islamism from above consciously propagating. In addition to consolidating state powers by ending its war of attraction with Islamic extremism, Zia government embraced the Islamist idea of state and society and used it to expand national and ethnic forces to its own. The alliance empowered the army government, which endorsed its suppression of freedom by pretending to be an Islamic system. Zia-ul-Haq's aim in spreading the doctrine of Islam was the political compulsions for bureaucracy. The Zia regime formed a close relation with the Jamaat I Islamic Conservative Party, which was central to the Islamic Nation movement (Muzaffar, et. al. 2017).

The religious fundamentalists have become isolated because they want Islamic doctrine to be applied, but Pakistan has secular ideology. In campaigning for religion, party leaders sought to develop their impact on politics. They promote their religious sects and increase their sectarian impact on society. These religious scholars have Such an impact raises sectarianism, fanaticism and fundamentalism. The religious scholar advises the government through a constitutional amendment to declare the Ahmadiyya party the state's minority (ICG, 2011).

The religious scientist aims to initiate the rebellion against the Ahmadi sect that explores state liberalism. Thus, the secular class gives religious leaders the confidence that they can fulfill their expectations and escape unrest. In 1978, after 25 years of life, the Ahmadiyya sector was declared non-Muslim by the constitutional amendment that started as Premier of Pakistan by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Following the massive political and religious victories, ILO leader demanded that the Pakistani government announce officially to its next military president Zia-ul-Haq that Islam is

Pakistan's official religion, and that any government affair follows the fundamental principle of Islam. Zia-ul-Haq accepted their demands and laid the seeds of radicalism and fundamentalism in Pakistan as government officials hand out state properties to madrassa and mosque religious leaders. This made it possible for "Islamic activist associations" to find a "instant stage" for achieving their goals. In this respect the Zia administration supported the creation of religious parties in secular lines.

The coalition between Islamism and the military dictatorship brought about peace, but it inevitably succumbed to too many inconsistencies and the divergent wishes of its main actors. In 1988, the official coalition between Islamism and the country also collapsed with the overthrow of the Zia-ul-Haq government. In an evolving political climate, the military and Islamists have met divergent priorities with the recovery of democracy and the rising influence of mainstream politics. As a result, power struggles between Islamist parties, military, civil and secular political institutions marked a democratic era after the Zia-ul-Haq years of 1988-99. The alliance of military powers and Islamic groups, which has steadily fused Pakistan's international and regional interests with Islam, have tried to resist the phenomenon, while the democratic forces have sought to re-calibration Pakistan's ideology, pushing it away from Islamisation to better serve growth and development.

Though the coalition was rippled by obstacles between the Islamists and the army. Second, religious nationalist groups want to block new elections and to remove conventional political parties from the political system, but do not want to be tied too closely to the rule of Musharraf. MutihadaMajlis-e Amal also saw a reduction in its power after it reached agreement with General Musharraf on his proposed constitutional amendments to the Military Government Legal Structure Order, allowing the General to be the military chief or president. With Afghanistan changing with Islamabad political pressure on the war on terror and insecurity, and the issue regarding spread of nuclear arms in South Afghanistan it is difficult for military troops to support their modus activision with Islamist forces. The army-Islamist partnership was part of a common Islamic nationalist philosophy in the Zia era. The dominance of General Musharraf is not Islamic and the abovementioned problems are also removed from his nationalistic pretensions.

Ayub Khan's Regime (1958-1969)

Haqqani 2005, Ayub was amazed at the Kamalist edition of Turkey. Like Kamal Ataturk, Ayub hoped to sever the bonds between his state and its immediate history, and its religious commitment to Islam by extending it, through drastic economic and social reforms. He kept religious political parties out of control in the early days of his rule as Ayub wanted to build the impression on western people as wise and educated representative of Muslims. But he allowed the political parties to reappear after the 1962 declaration of the Constitution. Jamaat-e-IslamiJI opposed theAyub system'snon-Islamic ideas when the administrative parties allowed them. He called the conference of fifty Ulema from the eastern and western countries, in order to condemn the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, before the suspension of political operations had been lifted. In August 1962, the Jamaat-e-Islami Central Council adopted resolutions in Lahore to condemn the Islamic Doctrine Consultative Council,

the Law on Muslim Families, the establishment of cinemas, the Pakistan Arts Council, the Blue Birds Guides and imports of Islamic vital books. In 1967 Ayub formed the Moon Sighting Committee to wipe out the conflict among the faithful during his successful Islamic period. In this situation, Ulema opposed the government of Ayub (Nasr, 2004).

"Republic of Pakistan" was the name of the country and "Islamic" was omitted in the 1962 Constitution. On the order of Ulema the definition of 'Islamic' was revived and that was Ulema's triumph and loss for the laity (Hayes, 1986). Ayub Khan amended the laws of the Islamic families in 1961 to ban polygamy and enforced the Family Law Order. This was meant to convey to the world that Pakistan was a country of freedom and dignity with the idea of freedom for women. Ulema believed and objected to those laws to be anti Islamic. Ulema's restlessness was limited by the government in particular. Ayub however recognized the need to negotiate and preserve the Islamic presence for the sake of political legitimacy. In light of modern developments and scientific progress the Ayub dictatorship aimed to give new life to the spirit of Islam. He felt we wanted Islam that everyone could comprehend. The Ulema Nationalist opposed Ayub's policy of modernization. He opposed his modernization plan under the control of Islamic political leaders who questioned his authority and in 1965 he even required Ulema's assistance (Ansari & Moten, 2003)

The role of JUI during the constitutional process was very important. The very first discussions about any constitutional provision begun on Article 2, which identified Islam as state religion, started as the personality of religious parties. Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani planned that no rule could interfere with Islamic teachings and objective resolution. He demanded, then, to add two more subclauses saying, "Not a law shall be repugnant to the teachings and requirements of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and the Sunna; and within five years from the beginning of the date, all existing laws shall comply with the Holy Qur'an and the Sunna" (Iqbal, 1986).

For election purposes, Ayub used Islamic cards. Fatima Jinnah, who was the United Opposition Parties (COP) electoral candidate at general election, was opposed by Ayub. He was supported by religious groups to create the fatwa of not making women as prime minister of a Muslim country (Haqqani, 2005). Molanathoughts that becoming president of the country was not necessary for a woman. The popular dispute is the government bribery of the clerics. The initial plan to keep Ayub away from clerics was demolished by this case (Haqqani, 2005). Ayub Khan has been mobilizing Islam in Pakistan. However, he publicly opposed the absolutism of Muslim thinkers and attempted to separate the spiritual from materialistic worlds. He felt faith was the only pillar for National Unity. He pushed Imam into masjids to start science and trying to go into politics with Maududi by providing him Bahawalpur university presidency. Ayub Khan requested Maududi's assistance during the 1965 war between India and Pakistan. He was incarcerated twice, although in 1964 and 1967. His regime was separate from the Jamaat-e-Islami nationalist philosophy.

Yahya Regime (1969-1971)

Yahya Khan took over the administration after the fall of Ayub in 1969. Yahya Khan utilised Islam to legitimise his reign and to form political connections with Islamists. He is a Jamaat-e-Islami ally, the first military coalition with the Islamic leaders. Yahya was named Jamaat-e-"Islamic Islami's Champion." During the 1970 election campaign against the expected electoral challenges against Bhuttos and Sheik Mujibour-Rahman in Western and East Pakistan, the military leadership under the Yahyafavoured an unofficial coalition with religious political parties. (Nasr, 2001).

Yahya Khan tried to establish a theology most essential to Pakistan's unity and protection. To retain control, the Awamey League and the Pakistan People's Party were used by Yahya Khan intelligence to institutionalize attacks by religious militant organisations on the principal political parties. All were accused of not being Islamic, capitalist and communist. The Yahya government began the conflict in 1971 as a fight for the Islamic identity of Pakistan. Yahya Khan claimed the opponents of Pakistan did their best to disrupt the system. The 1971 war took Pakistan down and Islam was used by military officials to support the doctrine and dignity of Pakistan, although this was not the case. (Nasr, 2004)

In 1971 Ulema finds that MujibururRehman is a secular king, supporting Yahya Khan in the civil war. Political and orthodox Islamist parties were then patronized and made politically powerful and founded by these ulema groups. The army began recruiting non-Bengalis members of the Razakah Force in East Pakistan and Islamist groups which supported Pakistan when the military action started in Eastern Pakistan. From the "Islamic standpoint, the IJT, which is the student arm of Jamaat-e-Islami, has an important significance for the number of volunteers working and the names of these Islamist brigades. (Haqqani, 2005).

Zia-ul-Haq Era (1977-1988)

To confirm his control, Zia exploited Islam as a political instrument. Yahya founded and later legitimized Zia as the corner pillar of the army and the Islamist association. For religious grounds and legitimacy, Pakistan tried to expand Islamification. Islamification was the corner stone of Zia's regime. Zia-ul-Haq was celebrated by Jamaat-e-Islami. A soul mate was identified in Zia's face by Jamaat-e-Islami. He argued that the demands of the people were Islamification, but he misunderstood the desires of most people. Social fairness and equality is what people needed. In 1979, the Hudood Ordinance was introduced to specifically prosecute women. Islamification aims to exploit people's Islamic emotions to conciliate non-secular political parties (Nasr, 2004). Zia visited Ulema and Mashaikh regularly at his residential office and also at conferences of his administration. "Zia ulHaq revised the motto of the army from peace, faith and obedience to ideology, religion and holy war. Religious traditions and piety were part of the appraisal by promoting military leaders." (Talbot, 2003)

The first one in the Raiwind Annual Meeting in Lahore will be the chief of TablighiJamaat. He inspired the troops for Tabligh, and most of them were involved. The Advisory Council on Islamic Doctrine has declared that the most pro-Islamic

presidential government is non-Islamic. Zia sees Islamic laws as part of Pakistan's promotion of stability and civil harmony. Zia focused on Sharia law and never on Islamic practices. Sharia law. A number of religious bodies, such as the Council of Islamic Orthodoxy (CII), a constitutionally designated body that advises the legislature as to whether a statute is repulsive of Islam, have since been set up and improved. In its early years, although with a few members of the church, the CII was primarily made up of lawyers and judges. Under Zia, it has been restored and expanded into orthodox ulamas. In 1980, "A Federal Shariat Court (FSC) was set up to provide orders not only on the substance of relevant rules, but on the removal of the non-Islamic statutes as well. In 1981, for instance, the death penalty was accepted by stoning. Even after Zia died in 1988 and Ulamas' military rule came to an end, these revisions empowered Ulama to turn Sunni Islam into state politics" (Talbot, 2003). In 1990, the FSC ruled that a death sentence without any hope of parole would be imposed on a blasphemy conviction.

In the Pakistan National Alliance movement (PNA) JUI played a radical role in 1977. The JUI is seeking to impose Sharia regulations as envisaged in HanfiFiqh and interpreted by UlamaDeobands like NanotviMaulanaQasim. The two are Ashraf Ali Thanvi, Mufti Mohammad Shafi, Maulana Zafar Ahmad Usmani and Maulana Hussain Ahmad Madni.

The opposition in President Zia-ul-Haq's 1980's policies to promote Mujahideen groups in Afghanistan who fought against the U.S.S.S. was triggered by the split of the JUI into two groups. A new community named JamiatUlma-e Islam-N, removed from JUI-F in 2008, is also not represented at domestic level. In the course of Zia years of regime, JamiatUlma-e Islam was furthermore able to create millions of madrassas, in particular in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa who played an important role in the development of Taliban. The Ulma-e Islam Jamiat mistrusted Zia's strong relations with the JI at the same time and backed the Democratic Restoration Movement (MRD), which initiated the Zia-ul-Haq government in Pakistan People's Party Agent. In short, this 'double relation with the Zia-ul-Haq government resulted in a split in the JUI-S party led by Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman and SamiulHaq. During Zia-ul-Haq government era, Sami-ul-Haq was a member of the national assembly" (Rahman, 2017).

Khaki-Mullah Nexus

As with Zia ulHaq, the army supported anti-Bhutto camps in the post-Zia periods of rule. Islamic parties provided the anti-Bhutto movements with a theoretical platform, on the other hand, on both electoral and non-electoral terms. This so-called Khaki-mullah alliance was reinforced even more in the context of the decade-long Afghanistan war in the 1980's. It should be remembered that the Jamaat e-Islami members praised the execution of Bhutto. "Some ministries were managed over Zia by Jamaat-e-Islami representatives, including information and broadcasting, population ministry, water and power and natural resources. Professor Khurshid Ahmad chose the ideologue to chair the planning commission and prepared a roadmap for the Islamisation of the economy." (Tanwir, 2005).

Jinnah has been identified as protecting Islam, while Ulama, whose significance for Pakistan was insignificant, has been granted liberating status. During Jinnah's 1981 birthday, journalists neglected to appeal to the Constituent Assembly asking for religious equality and the domestic reduction of religion. An advisory assembly of accepted representatives was set up and Majlis-i-titile Shura's was granted. A Consultative Meeting was formed with the title of Majlis-i-Shura. But Ulama opposed Majlis-i-Shura, whose decision Shura would already be made in the Qur'an by the government. In August 1983, the Islamic Philosophy Consultative Council announced that Islam was closest to the presidential form of government. The friction between various faith expressions was intensified by the Islamic culture of Zia. Zia's attempts to bring Islam at the center of Pakistan's broader sectarian spread of public life. The results of these divisions persist in contemporary Pakistan.

Aftermaths of Khaki-Mullah Nexus

Military governments have exploited and planned religion and partnerships with terrorist movements for international geopolitical interests. The uproar in the 1990s was serious and was the result of Zia's education policies on current orthodoxism and bigotry. The Zia policies have contributed to an overwhelmed intolerance and retrogression of a great part of our culture rather than recognition and secularism, and Islamic militancy. A new dimension has taken on in the Zia era the long-standing debate regarding the role of Islam in public life. Islamization was initially funded by the State by legal, socioeconomic, and educational reforms and improvements to Pakistan's Penal Code.

In the geopolitical context of the Afghan conflict, Islamization flourished domestically and drew impetus from the rapid socio-economic transformations of the late 70's, and the decrease in the state since Bangladesh came about. His legacy was to make Ulama more powerful than ever, while the laid Islamist Ji activists were first closest to the Zia government. The war supported 'the link between Islamic extremists and military forces and their intelligence arm, ISI, which contributed to the outcomes of the war on terror after September 9. Zia Islamization coincided with the war in Afghanistan, which began a big process which continued to influence Pakistan."(Nasr, 2001) & (Yaseen & Muzaffar, 2018).

Islamism and Civilian Rule

As a result, "The Zia years of 1988-99 were accompanied by a democratic period of power struggles between military and civilian policy-makers, Islamist groups and secular state institutions. This has not only helped undermine domestic problems, which have ultimately undermined independence, but also made Pakistan's soul more subtle rivalry " (Nasr, 2001). By weaving Pakistan with Islam steadily and by seeking to anchor national politics in the discourse on Islamisation, Pakistan's alliances of foreign policy and regional interests have sought to counter this trend just as democratic powers have sought to reevaluate Pakistan's ideology, moving Pakistan off Islamization, to further increase development and modernisation. The alliance was first cobbled together, with numerous "pro-Zia groups," the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), which led Nawaz Sharif and Islamist Parties, Jama'at-i-Islami and the two Ulama Parties, Jami'at-i-Ulama-i Islam (Ulama Society of Islam, JUI) and Jami'at-i-Ulama-i Pakistan (Ulama Society of Pakistan, JUP). (Nasr, 2004).

The Islamic Democratic Alliance (IDA) coalition IslamiJumhooriIttihad was tasked with countering the PPP at the 1988 election, voicing the pro-Zia movements on a democratic basis, and using the mechanism to subvert the advancement of the PPP and Benazir Bhutto. In the course of time the army "considered the IJT to defeat the PPP and reproduce the Islamization order of Zia" through the electoral process. The IJT worked in the beginning. It could reduce the electoral success of the PPP in the 1988 elections (and even win the Punjab Assembly elections and form the government in that province). Moreover, "the use of the transparent mechanism of democracy has succeeded to uphold the achievements of Islamization and to prevent the PPP from consolidating power and governing effectively" (Nasr, 2004).

The PPP's power battle with the IJT led to a condition of governability in Pakistan between 1988 and 1993. Divided Parliaments faced changes in political allegiances, economic crises, corruption and growing paralysis between Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto. Meanwhile, Ghulam Ishaq Khan's continuing interference in the democratic process by the military and his ally and Zia's senior adviser led to the retirement of two governments - first the PPP, then the IJT. Meanwhile, economic growth in Pakistan has slowed down and widespread discontent has risen with the administration.

The continued involvement of the military in the democratic sphere has reduced the PPP's influences and the military to its advantage and undermined the developing democracy. However, this success was to the detriment of the IJT's weakening and hence the disruption of the coalition between right-of-center civil leaders in the PML and the Islamists establishing the pillars of the Zia administration, followed by the IJT. The revolutionary age opened up new prospects for both PML and Islamist movements. Freed from the constraints of Zia's military dictatorship, both political forces began in the 1980s to see the prospect of controlling Pakistan's affairs in a way they could not foresee. The first to recognize and distinguish his party from the military was Nawaz Sharif, the PML chairman. As a result, in 1993, he was expelled by the machinations which took office his first party in 1990.

In addition, religious assaults, militancy and sectarianism have been on the rise in this country. In recent years, a pogrom has been witnessed in over one state by religiously unprivileged people. Since 11-9-11, there has been a growing concern in the communication between faith and state policy. The influential and educational discussion on the issue has risen significantly. Among other items, the coverage does not provide analysis into this burning dilemma and discussion of the social and governmental circumstances of this modern trend. (Smith, 2015)

Brake to Military-Islamism

In 1990 and 1992, Jama'at-i Islamic leadership, like QaziHusayn Ahmad actively split its group from the PML and helped the military remove the Nawaz Sharif government in 1992. The Jamaat ran alone in the 1993 elections when QaziHusayn introduced himself in alternative to Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. After 1993, the view began to shift. Nawaz Sharif's appeal to the Islamic vote bank revealed the results of the 1993 elections. The Jama'at did not do well, although the PML kept an Islamic poll. The findings suggest that "a large center-right party is

growing that would represent Islamic voting, which would make Islamist parties negligible. This was the first time Islamism has been thwarted by the democratic process in the Muslim world" (Ullah, 2013).

However, the military was less concerned with restricting Islamism and more about restricting mainstream parties. These findings surprised the military. They expect Jama'at to restrict the PML's electoral performance and that Nawaz Sharif will not curry favor with the public without Islamist alliances. The outcome was "An Islamist-military coalition without any political prominence and a largely separate centre-right group which claims to deprive the military of power over Islamism. The military also grew dissatisfied with the failure of Hikmatyar, after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, to gain charge of Kabul and subsequently perceived Jamaat's mainstream Islamism and its ilk as struggling to deal with both domestic and international problems. The Zia regime's Islamist army was now seen as a spent force. The military then continued to look elsewhere. The transition took place in 1994 with the Taliban rising after the turn in Afghanistan, as discussed previously." (Malik, 2010).

A recent radical Islamist movement brought the rise of the Taliban to Pakistan. Unhappy with both Hikmatyar and Jama'at, Pakistan's army has now turned to a new military activity to strengthen its position in the politics of Pakistan and in the war in Afghanistan. The Taliban's empowerment gave free rein to Pakistani groups who voiced and provided recruitment and support for their vision. The JUI has used its role to keep the Taliban and domestic terrorist groups seamlessly linked. The military believed, as the Taliban's version of the Islamist system was more effective in Afghanistan's battlefield, that populism could serve the military's purpose to manipulate domestic politics more effectively. General Musharraf was particularly suited for the use of militant forces for the domestic and also in Kashmir overthrow of the civilian government.

Elections of 1997 and Grievance of Army

A new path for Pakistan has been set out by the PML government that came to power in 1997. The polls in 1997 were the first since 1988 to impose on a party a clear mandate. The PML led by "Nawaz Sharif" had a majority of seats at the National Assembly (63 percent). The polls produced the smallest contingent of Islamist involvement in Parliament (a close contrast with the elections of 2002)" (Ansari & Moten, 2003). The results allowed Nawaz Sharif to "compete for the control of Pakistan's politics, for the concept of civil rule-Islam relations and for the establishment of a permanent connection between Islam and the State. In order to do this, he freely designed the PML as a political modern party that is committed to the creation of Pakistan, and champion of Islamicisation" (Ansari & Moten, 2003) He placed PML as a 'Islamic Democratic Party' Sharif, an industrialist in Punjab, a recognized Muslim pious and influential, close to European Christian Democratic party. He used his image to argue that he would satisfy the criteria of Islamization just as he would seek growth.

The PML had to maintain a rational center-right government which was not in the hands of Islamic parties and which had a strong claim to represent Pakistan's mainstream and national religious wishes to rule. Sharif modeled the PML after the

National Organization of Malaysia (UMNO). In the 80s, Islamic revolution was successfully co-opted and both Islamization and neoliberal development were included. Mushahid Husayn said as a senior PML official, "Nawaz Sharif will be both the [Necmetin] [Islamist Refah Group leader] Erbakan and the [Malaysian Mohammed] Pakistani Mahathir. The PML's argument has been strengthened by the fact that it has taken over seats formerly occupied by Islamist parties and defeated the Islamist candidates running in the election. It argued that it could be best represented by the needs of the Islamic voting fund." (Tanwir, 2005).

The military saw the gambit of Nawaz Sharif as a challenge under General Pervez Musharraf, who was named head of the army in 1998. If Nawaz Sharif had succeeded in forming a stable right of center and Islamic alliance, he would have governed the center of Pakistan. Moreover, it would have established and managed the relationship between Islam and the State through a political and not military faction. The army under General Musharraf turned to militant movements to overthrow Sharif. Sectarian violence exploded in Pakistan throughout 1998-99 and militant agitation in Kashmir became stronger. Two attempts by armed groups related to the army to the life of Nawaz Sharif were made before the 1999 coup. The military's objective was to destabilize the PML's ties to its constituency in a way that a stable center-right alliance would not be feasible, by promoting a radicalization and support of jihadist violence and by further radicalizing Islamism in general. In 1999, when a separatist invasion of Indian-held Kashmir took the two nations to the verge of war, the military used resistance forces in Kashmir to harass Sharif, most popular of them in Kargil, and then severely debacle Nawaz Sharif.

Musharraf Regime (1999-2008)

Pervez Musharraf has been influenced by and embraced his policies by Kamal Ataturk, the founder of the modern Turkish president. He wanted a contemporary and non-religious Pakistan, "like Turkey, where religion is treated as the personal interest of the citizen. However, Musharraf has taken on the role models of Zia's colleagues, Sharif ud Din Pirzada and Atiya Inayat Ullah, in his administration. Pervez Musharraf partially reversed the Islamization direction of Zia ul Haq" (Ansari & Moten, 2003). He campaigned for the participation of women in the public life, took out cultural events, and kept free entertainment in liberal newspapers.

Musharraf adopted the view from Enlightened Moderation (EM) that defied his domestic, international and external policies in Pakistan of the current wave of modernization. After his Islamic opposition, MMA, explained his involvement in politics in parliament, he had duality on his EM agenda. In the 2002 elections, two leading party figures have been exiled and their parties have lost. The candidates of the Six Religious Parties (Muttahida-i-Majlis-i-Amal) took advantage of the anti-American feelings of the frontier regions of Afghanistan and were successful in elections. Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) published a statement when Musharraf seized office, asking military leaders to keep corrupt officials accountable and condemning Musharraf's State Emergency Order and stating that JI did not accept martial law and civil law suspension. "It was also stated in the declaration that whatever occurs in the

world is because we have not accepted the Islamic framework. JI supported Musharraf's military rule and became his ally in this assertion" (Malik, 2010).

Elections of 2002 Electoral Alliance of MutahhidahMajlis Amal(MMA)

In the national elections of 2002, the dilemmas facing Musharraf were illustrated. In these surveys, PML and PPP were highly affected. Their leaders were removed and their sides were split by the military into independent units. In addition, in polling stations, some anomalies have disputed some results. In particular, to increase the standard of parliamentary candidates, 'the military decreed that higher education graduate candidates should be provided, that many political veterans should be disqualified from competition, and that qualifications granted to higher education graduates by madrasahs (ijazahs). The PPP and PML and Islamist groups have done the same." These measures have disadvantaged. (ICG, 2011)

The Islamist parties (JUI, Jama'at, JUP and smaller ulama and shi'i parties) formed an electoral coalition: MutahhidahMajlis Amal (United Action Front, MMA). "The alliance shared the Muslim parties' unhappiness about the Musharraf government, the Taliban's failure and the war against terror. It also reflected that the Islamic parties could now reverse the losses that they had suffered in the 1993-99 period of PML and PPP supremacy" (Malik, 2010). The MMA was also granted the militant implicit support which is widely regarded as leading to the combining of the MMA. The PML and PPP were seen by general Musharraf as the key barriers to Pakistan's military supremacy. He was comparatively less interested with Islamic organizations, which he said were nevertheless abused by the military. While JUI is represented by the MMA's electoral body (the highest parliamentary leader and authority of the NWFP Assembly), Jama'at Chairman QaziHusayn Ahmad has largely kept the Alliance's operational and political architecture as the brainchild. Qazi conceived the MMA for the benefit of tug-of-war army, PML and PPP isolationist factions. He proposed that the MMA would grant Islamists the power to take the military's or lay/secular institutions' control over Islamism.

Qazi claims that JUI and Jama'at remain capable of creating a strong national mass movement. It is a key player in the politics of Pathan and has powerful resources among insurgents as well. JUI has fair presence in the rural and tribe regions. In comparison to urban Pakistan, the Jama'at has unparalleled street strength and the strategic and administrative know-how to turn the MMA into a credible political force. The goal would be to ensure that the MMA remains Pakistan's main centre-right party - like the PML was before the 1999 coup. The MMA has thus distanced itself from the forces of Jihad. "Sipah Sahabah Pakistan (SSP, with its links to Taliban, and Al-Qaeda) was not a member of the MMA after 9/11 and its leader, Azam Tariq, was still the most influential Islamist ally of General Musharraf before its assassination, in October 2003." (Ullah, 2013).

Relations between Military and the MMAafter 2002 Election

"Two changes were notable since October 2002: the first was the MMA's preservation of unity and durability in the light of attempts taken by the military to bridge it. Second, General Musharraf faced strong opposition to his attempts to revamp the Constitution in order to enforce military rule" (Tanwir, 2005). The tyrant

was blamed for attempting to formalize military political interference, primarily as a chief of the Army. The PML and PPP rump, but even the MMA, were at the helm of the Musharraf resistance. Musharraf's decree endorsed the MMA. "The General, in support of the MMA, has undermined the PML and PPP and seems interested in rooting out financing for these groups" (Nasr, 2004). Despite the promising returns from the Musharraf government for the MMA, the alliance is keen to refine its diplomatic aims and to avoid being a political tool. As a result, the MMA led the House charges against Musharraf's violation of the Constitution and his support for the United States in the war against terrorism.

The constitutional amendments proposed by General Musharraf, chief of Jamaath, Qazi Hussain, at the frontline of the opposition to the Legal System order requested that the head of Jamaath, Qazi Hussein, drop his uniform in order to remain a president. "In August 2003, the MMA and the JUI Chief Mawlana Sami ul-Haq led Ulama to sign a Fatwa declaring haram for dispatching soldiers to Iraq and banning Ulama members from carrying out funeral prayers on Pakistani soldiers murdered" (Talbot, 2003). Furthermore, in behalf of Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan (founder of the Pakistan nuclear programme), the MMA has carried out strikes and protests. The MMA has been sponsored by the Pathan Nationalism and the Center Military since the October 2002 elections in the former NWFP. (Tanwir, 2005).

Musharraf is ideologically committed to creating in Pakistan a moderate and apolitical Islam - the Islam of Jinnah, he terms it. However, he is in front of secular policy organizations which traditionally have represented this journey to Islam. The PML and PPP seem to be the dictator's main threats toward his rule. The moderate Islamic voting and the modern middle class were segregated from the military government during the war with those groups. In fact, the MMA is the only feasible civil partner for the military. Indeed, the MMA as a "Military Mullah Alliance" is expected to be sponsored by General Musharraf. "The formal arrangement with the MMA, furthermore, established a modus vivendi between him and the military. Benazir Bhutto's PPP and Nawaz Sharif's PML are the two publicly anti-Musharraf movements following the settlement. (Talbot, 2003). Musharraf is forcefully compelled to give up his secularist pretense and hand out important influence to the MMA as the biggest divide in Pakistani politics is between the PPP and PML generals and civilian leaders and not between the military or Islamists.

However, tensions are packed with the alliance between the Islamists and the military. First, Islamist groups, however, do not want to get too close to the Musharraf government, wish to block new elections and to force civil society out of the city system. "The MMA has already experienced a decrease in its prestige following the agreement with General Musharraf on its planned constitutional amendments to the Legal System Order that a legitimate military law demands that the ruler behave both as military leaders and president" (Ansari & Moten, 2003). More specifically, in view of trends in Afghanistan and international pressure on Islamabad on wars against terror, insecure southern Afghanistan and the question of nuclear proliferation, it is impossible for the army to retain with Muslim groups his norm activation. The Zia era saw a common Islamic nationalist worldview for the partnership among army and Islamists. The rule of General Musharraf is not Islamic and his nationalism is also distanced by the questions above. (Ansari & Moten, 2003)

Conclusion

As tensions increase, without the fueling of Islamism the military – Pakistan's leading political player – may not stay engaged politically. Ideologies remain vague and the idea of a secularizing military has always existed. The military should have given the MMA back to the system of military-islamist ties in the 1980s, when the military is faced with strict opposition to their authority. The work of political religious political groups inside the modern political scenario is directed at improving the way Islam is explained in a narrow, disciplinary manner. They have adopted positions on militant jihad: on the one hand, pacific ties with militant groups within the context of the democratic framework; on the other hand, the theoretical aim is to implement the Sharia Law (Islamic law). Moreover, when the mainstream religious parties introduced their political agenda, they formed relations with outlawed militants, various student associations and militant organisations, and they were more than eager to accomplish political aims by coercion. Both political parties are submissive to the presidency, whether religious or popular. Both political parties should then operate in favour of country solidarity and stability and play their role in the nation's growth and development. Following the achievement in 1980s on the political and judiciary stage, the parties gain prominence as a result of the assistance they received from their military in the parliament and are now confronted with path instability and aggression against the government in the absence of military support and non-attendance.

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