

## Pakistan's Joining of US –Sponsored Military Pacts and Nehru's Criticism

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### Abstract

*The bilateral relations between United States and India have been significant since beginning and developed progressively and finally took a shape of strategic and nuclear partnership. Both sides' divergent approaches of foreign policy did not harm their bilateral relations. India became independent in the early years of the Cold War period, when the aims of US foreign policy were mainly associated with strategy of containment of communism and the threats arose from the Soviet bloc. The government of Prime Minister Nehru (1947-64), adopted policy neutralism and avoided to join the US-sponsored politics of alliances. The Indian view of peaceful coexistence was based on 'Panchsheel Doctrine' which strengthened its non-aligned status and its goals of foreign policy in regional setting that largely focused to attain a prominent role in the area. Thus it is important to note that despite clash in approaches and incompatibility of their foreign policies goals, the bilateral relationship remained constant but discrepancy in their foreign policies priorities became the foremost reason of estrangement in the initial years, which lasted till the eruption of 1962 Sino-Indian War.*

**Key Words:** Nehru's Criticism, Pakistan, US –Sponsored Military Pacts

### Introduction

India played an important role in the American economy. The American business community viewed India as an area for trade and investment also. In April 1947, US government called for the elimination of problems that foreign companies faced in India. The US government also announced that 'no business further with India, unless plans for nationalization were not dropped.' Nehru saw many advantages for India in a closer economic relationship with the United States. Under the pressures of U.S. - sponsored Point Four program, the Indian government surrendered some of the essential points of its economic policy. It discarded the nationalization program. The American demand was for an end to the rule that 51 per cent of the capital in some industries. The United States Secretary of Treasury stated on August 9, 1949 that the 51 per cent rule was 'a significant deterrent to American investment abroad.' The Indian government modified the 51 per cent rule to the advantage of Washington. India signed the general Point Four Agreement with the United States on December 28, 1950 (Aquinas, et. al. 1948). In 1951, the Government of India approached the United States for a loan on easy terms for the purchase of two million tons of grains from American stocks. Truman and the party leaders argued their case on the ground that the Indian people were in distress and United States should lend them a helping hand. They also stressed the fact that India was an important democracy in Asia and this timely assistance would save India from flirtations with communism. India persuaded the United States primarily for economic

benefits. However, it did not offer to commit for military material and maintained that it was neither part of the two blocs (Yaseen, et. al, 2021).

Nehru defined non-alignment as avoiding military alliance with any country. He believed that joining one bloc or other would lessen India's chances for influence in world affairs. Alliance was dangerous. India assumed to have good links with the U. S. and the Communist bloc. Thus, it had become a main effort of Indian diplomacy to convince the United States and its allies that its emphasis on state planning did not mean a measure toward communism and further not to convince Russia and its allies that its economic policy did not mean a drive towards capitalism or a threat to their interests. Thus India persuaded both blocs to spread economic aid by ensuing a policy of non-alignment (Morgenthau, 1959).

India could not join the American alliance on security grounds because such a step might have forced communist China which was capable of overrunning India in the event war. India's swift recognition of the People's Republic of China in 1949, its consent of China's forceful re-entry into Tibet in 1950, and its support of China's claim for a seat at the United Nations were manifestations of this decision, that the establishment of better neighborhood (Aquinas, et. al. 1948).

The Indian government thought that policy of non-alignment would be the best assurance for its security. Nehru had reflected this belief and caution in his writings. when Pakistan entered the Western alliance in February 1954. He said: The Cold War had reached South Asia, and the danger of attack from Pakistan became evident. The United States decision to supply military aid to Pakistan created anxieties in New Delhi (Muzaffar, et. al. 2018). Nehru said that defense alliances openly aimed against some other country or countries and they wanted to maintain peace through strength (Nuechterlein, 1976). Nehru's opposition to military coalitions stemmed to a great extent from his understanding that these alliances troubled world peace while threatening India's security (Yaseen, et. al. 2016).

After collapse of the Nationalist China, the ideal objective for the United States was that India would serve as the anchor of American power in Asia. If this image was partially strategic, it was also to a certain extent economic, supposing the integration of Asia into American economy through India. The State Department realized this in the context of the new offers of the Truman Administration to Nehru.

### **Contrasting Foreign Policies**

The most evident difference between the external policies of India and the United States was that India's foreign policy was non-aligned, while U.S. foreign policy was based on a concept of military alliances for the purpose of containing communism.

The United States had followed a strategy of isolationism for decades. It had adopted and followed that policy of standoffishness throughout the nineteenth century realizing its military and economic weakness (Aquinas, et. al. 1948). Indians said that India's policy of non-alignment also like U.S. policy of isolationism. India's policy was also to avoid involvement in conflicts.

The United States had entered into Military alliances with a number of countries and established military bases in those areas. India primarily opposed such a policy. In the pursuit of such a policy, the United States joined mutual defense pacts with states like Australia, New Zealand, Philippines, Japan, South Korea and Nationalist China, and Pakistan. As the success of the Communists in taking over North Vietnam, the United States structured the SEATO in September 1954. It encouraged the formation of the Baghdad Pact in 1955 without joining it. India considered all these moves as fundamentally wrong. Despite having clashing foreign policies, India consistently got economic aid from United States under Truman doctrine. In case of Greece and Turkey, to keep them secure from Communist influence, U.S. President Truman requested the US Congress for military and economic aid. Truman promulgated the Truman Doctrine. Under this doctrine, the President recommended a package of military aid worth \$400 million for Greece and Turkey. His request induced an encouraging response from the US Congress. Congress passed an Act on 22 May 1947 allowing the US Administration to provide military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey. It also authorized the President to send military and civilian experts to advise the Greek and Turkish Governments. India took benefit of emergency food under Truman doctrine.

After economic assistance of countries which were facing economic crisis and threatened by expanding influence of communism, US launched the Eisenhower Doctrine that was to provide a military support to countries vulnerable to communism.

### **The Eisenhower Doctrine**

The Suez Crisis of 1956-57 produced a situation which acted to be highly favorable to communist intrusion or overt attack. President Dwight D. Eisenhower of the United States was alarmed at the possibility of a risk of a communist attack in the Middle East region. President Eisenhower proposed the Congress on January 5 1957 a policy which was later known as Eisenhower Doctrine. He asked for right to operate the armed forces of the United States in response to some request made by any nation of the Middle East for security against aggression from Communist countries. He also asked to use Mutual Security funds to extend economic or military support to those countries. The Congress agreed to empower President. The main purpose of the Eisenhower Doctrine was to meet the threats of communism. India severely criticized US –sponsored collective security system and preferred a neutral approach. So subsequently, India and U.S. relations moved in an opposite direction (Aquinas, et. al. 1948).

### **Pakistan's Joining of US – Sponsored Military Alliance and Nehru criticism**

That time Pakistan was looking for assistance to strengthen its security. Furthermore Pakistan had ideological differences with Soviet Union. Pakistani leadership was sternly against communist aggressive designs for spreading communism. Pakistan's founders made request to the United States for aid to meet its defense needs. Pakistan, due to its unique strategic location attracted the Americans and they started bracketing Pakistan's association for accomplishment of the US global strategy of containment of Communism. Pakistan appeared as the front-line state for the United States and other western allies (Muzaffar, et. al, 2017)

The resemblances of interests and mutual need of each other brought these unequal powers close. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan paid visit to United States in May 1950. This was greatly successful visit as it opened great vistas of the friendship. Liaquat Ali declared that Pakistan was resolved to put all its weight to help for stability in Asia. He added that stability in Asia is most vital for our freedom and development for the maintenance of international peace'. The American policy makers were inspired by Liaquat Ali Khan's speech and acknowledged Pakistan as a bulwark against the expansion of the Soviet influence. Saying his views in report to the Congress, President Truman stated: Pakistan's association would become a vital factor for stability of the Near East region. Pakistan is also a valuable ally in South Asia due to its strategic location in the Indian Ocean and its access Central Asia. The United States provided economic assistance to Pakistan in 1952 as 'defense support,' being important in US security strategy for Asia. The aid was used by Pakistan to fill its stocks of ammunition and spare parts. The United States provided economic assistance to Pakistan in 1952 as 'defense support,' being important in US security strategy for Asia. The aid was used by Pakistan to fill its stocks of ammunition and spare parts. When Republicans came into power in 1953, a new defense policy called "New Look" was announced. United States intended to avoid direct involvement in other Korean-type operations in the new strategy. It also emphasized the "enlargement of a arrangement of regional defense pacts and alliances". United States was determined to secure the free world from the extension of international communism by firming the like-minded nation through economic and military aid with its new plan.(Miller, 2007)

February 22, 1954, Pakistan made a formal appeal for military aid, and after three days Eisenhower accepted Pakistan's request and decided under Manual Defense Assistance Program, to help Pakistan. A treaty of cooperation between Pakistan and Turkey was to begin "the implementation of the 'northern tier' concept", was concluded as it empathized when the

U.S. National Security Council agreed over its judgment of providing military aid to Pakistan. On April 2, 1954, this Turkey-Pakistan agreement was signed in Karachi and in the subsequent month on May 19, the United States and Pakistan also concluded a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement. This was the First defense treaty between the United States and Pakistan which marked the commencement of a security alliance. In order to fortify Pakistan, the United States agreed to enable Pakistan with equipment, material, services and other support for the defense capabilities. Then, Pakistani leaders were fully pleased with the agreement as they saw it as a guarantor of Pakistan's security. Before concluding the pact, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali, indicated that its adherence to the treaty would enable Pakistan to guard its integrity and sovereignty.

Both India and Soviet Union were disturbed by the Pakistan's military agreement with the United States. This caused in rising a big hue and cry by India and Soviet Union, but the cordial relationship.

Before becoming Prime Minister, Nehru said the country would stay 'out of entanglement in the power struggle with the belief that such was the best for India and world peace as well'. Nehru added that there was 'a great fear of American

economic penetration', but he believed that India would have to depend on the United States for certain types of support'. Overall, he underscored India's desire for friendly relations with the United States. ("United States Treaties and Other International Agreements," 1962)

India expressed desire to have an independent foreign policy isolated from the power blocs. The main American concern in Asia was related to the China's Nationalist leader, Chiang Kai-shek, and the growing strength of his Chinese Communist opponents. In India, in addition to his duties as Prime Minister, continued as Foreign Minister. In his many speeches and writings on international issues over the years, and especially in 1946 and 1947, Nehru had uttered the comprehensive outlines of the foreign policy India would follow. Nehru's desired that Asia's destiny must be in Asian hands and that Europe played an educed role. Nehru visualized a close partnership with China and its leader nationalist Chiang Kai-shek, a supporter of Indian independence. Nehru desired that India should play an active role in world affairs without joining either of the two power blocs. He preferred a policy of "non-entanglement." Nehru believed, India would preserve its sovereignty, and freedom of action, upsurge its international stature, and decrease the possibility that foreign affairs would appear as a divisive domestic issue. In any case, as the strongest power in South Asia, India did not need external support to bolster its foreign policy status Nehru gave his thoughts on India's foreign policy:

India wanted to avoid involvement with neither of the power blocs, but, wished for warm relations with the both powers, Soviet Union and United States. India disliked the undemocratic and authoritarian nature of the Soviet regime.

India had concerns that American economic power would in some way impinge on her sovereignty. At the same time, India needed and desired US capital goods to help the country's development. (William J. 1972) & Barnds, n.d.)

### **Divergent Approach on Kashmir Dispute**

Quite apart from political considerations, Jawaharlal Nehru had a strong emotional attachment to Kashmir, his family's homeland. Nehru termed the American and British attitude on Kashmir, as 'completely wrong.' he charged, 'The U.S.A. and the U.K. have played a dirty role'. 'the motives of the United State were to get military and economic concessions in Pakistan.'

The US pressure in support of UNCIP progressively displeased New Delhi. On 15 August 1949, reacting to charges India was not behaving in good faith and manner on Kashmir dispute. Nehru called US Ambassador Loy Henderson, he was "tired of receiving moral advice from the United States . . . . So far as Kashmir was concerned he would not give an inch. He would hold his ground even if Kashmir, India, and the whole world went to pieces." ("United States Treaties and Other International Agreements," 1962)

Kashmir figured prominently in the official talks between US officials and Prime Minister Nehru when he was on visit to the United States in October and November 1949. After President Harry Truman raised the issue with Nehru during a White House meeting, Nehru agreed on the importance of finding a solution.

Secretary of State Acheson failed in a subsequent dialogue with Nehru to pin the Indian leader down on specifics. An annoyed Acheson wrote, "I got a curious mixture of a public speech and flashes of anger and deep displeasure for his opponents." Nehru's main arguments according to Acheson were that the UN should not deal with the merits of the dispute until the Pakistani forces withdrew from Kashmir, that a plebiscite on the basis of a religious ideology. It would be catastrophic for the stability of the subcontinent and that the Pakistanis had no legitimate claim to Kashmir.

Chronic friction between Washington and New Delhi over Kashmir inexorably had a adverse impact on bilateral relations as Nehru predicted. In October 1952, Nehru wrote G.L. Mehta, the Bombay businessman, he was appointed to succeed Mr. Pandit as Ambassador to Washington, that India has told the State Department "in the clear words that we consider, their attitude in this matter entirely wrong and unfriendly to India and that this comes in the way of the growth of cordial relations between In and America, that all of us desire, more than anything else."

For Indians, the Kashmir question was a central and vital foreign policy issue inevitably related with the traumatic partition of British India and the creation of Pakistan.(Miller, 2007)

The United States looked at Kashmir quite differently. Washington viewed the problem as a serious dispute between two states with which the United States had friendly relations, but not as an question involving vital US interests. Kashmir also acted to be the type of regional dispute that the United Nations should be able to resolve, as India's original proposal for a plebiscite provided a basis for settlement. The Concern in Washington was that in the absence of a settlement fighting would again break out between India and Pakistan. Although at first Washington d took no strong position on the merits, the United States sponsored the UN call for a plebiscite and gradually became frustrated by Nehru's backsliding on this matter and by incremental steps New Delhi took to properly incorporate Kashmir into the Indian Union.

### **Difference on International Issues**

Beside Kashmir, the United States and India were at odds on many foreign policy questions unrelated to the Cold War. International control of atomic energy, Palestine, and the creation of Israel, Indonesia, and Indo-China were issues on which the two countries differed.

Despite disappointments over Pakistan-US alliance, Kashmir dispute and differences on international issues, Nehru remained hopeful about relations with Washington and US also continued economic cooperation with India. Democratic and secular India expected the support of the United States. The United States as leader of the democratic world expected that free and democratic India would back the general thrust of US policy in dealing with the Soviet threat. Washington did not welcome India's effort to follow a path between the Western democratic and Communist totalitarian camps. Nehru warned that US arms to Pakistan would bring the Cold War to the region, and would have "very far-reaching consequences on the

whole structure of things in South Asia and especially in India and Pakistan.” (“United States Treaties and Other International Agreements,” 1962)

Quite apart from annoyance over Pakistan's membership, Nehru regarded SEATO as “harmful to Asia as well as the cause of peace”. He commented, “The habit of the West to carry the “white man's burden” in the East still continued, even though conditions in the world and Asia have changed greatly.”

Eisenhower gave his approval but again expressed concern about the Indian reaction. He directed that “every possible public and private means at our disposal be used to ease the effects of our action on India.”

For Washington, the main consideration was relatively simple: through arms to Pakistan, the United States thought it was taking an important step in advancing the policy of containment of Communism by strengthening the chain of collective security arrangements around the borders of the Soviet Union. In the administration's eyes, as reflected in NSC 5409, the action strengthened the defense of the region against the Communist threat and was not intended to make Pakistan the dominant state in South Asia. The United States gained in Pakistan a new ally in the Cold War, a Muslim country with a proud military tradition and, on paper at least, a substantial number of fighting troops that, would be available for the defense of the oil-rich Persian Gulf.

Although Washington recognized Pakistan's primary motivation was to strengthen itself against India, the US leadership believed Pakistan was also concerned about the threat of Communism. The Pakistanis pointedly played up their alleged worries about the danger from the Soviet bloc in talking with American officials. (“United States Treaties and Other International Agreements,” 1962) Neither Byroade nor John Foster Dulles were concerned that US arms would upset the South Asia power balance. Because India was far stronger than its neighbor, the small amount of arms then contemplated, NSC 5409 projected only \$10 million annually, could hardly present a credible military threat to India.

Nehru strongly opposed military alliances in Asia, but especially in South Asia. In his view, “the fact that Pakistan aligns itself completely with one of the great military blocs necessarily makes it subservient to the policy of that bloc.” (Nuechterlein, 1976) He saw a “loss of Pakistan's freedom and that country's becoming progressively a satellite of the United States.” (Aquinas, St. Thomas. *Summa Theologica.*, 1948) The amount of aid concerned Nehru less than the qualitative change from the arms decision. “Pakistan,” he stated, “will become definitely lined up with the Western powers and, a region of cold war now and shooting war perhaps later” (Aquinas, et. al. 1948).

Nehru thought that the United States, in deciding to give arms to Pakistan, was in part motivated by its opposition to Indian neutralism. Until 1954, the Indian leader hoped to develop an area of peace, a region that stood apart from the two Power blocs, based loosely on the Arab-Asian group of independent states then emerging from colonialism. Burma, Indonesia, and Egypt were, in Nehru's view, leaning in this direction. By accepting US military aid, Pakistan, whose foreign policy

Until then was mainly concerned with the Kashmir issue, “breaks up this Arab-Asian group and enlarges the possible area of war.

The final derailment came after the arms aid decision. Nehru warned the Pakistanis that they could not have it both ways: US arms would be regarded as an unfriendly act in India and the whole issue of Kashmir would change. Mohammed Ali replied that a military alliance with the United States had nothing to do with India, although he told US News and World Report that Pakistan's enhanced military strength would improve the prospects for a Kashmir solution.

Once the arms decision was firm, Nehru carried out his threat to toughen India's stance on Kashmir. The bilateral discussions collapsed. Within the year, the Indians were refusing to talk about a plebiscite as a way to settle the dispute. Since then, New Delhi's position has remained that the people of Kashmir had spoken for India by electing the constituent assembly and Kashmiris wanted.

In November and December 1955, Communist Party General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev and Premier Nikolai Bulganin paid a reciprocal state visit to India. They toured the country for almost a month, receiving an enormously warm welcome wherever they went. What was popularly called "the B & K show" because of the colorful antics of Khrushchev—reached its high point on 9 December in Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir. To the delight of his hosts, Khrushchev dropped Soviet neutrality on Kashmir to proclaim support for India's position. The Russians seconded the Indian view that the ratification of Kashmir's accession by the state's constituent assembly was proof that the people of Kashmir had already expressed their will at the ballot box.

Khrushchev's policy change boosted the Soviet Union's popularity in India. If Pakistan could count on the United States for support, India now had a powerful friend of its own. The Soviet shift also had the practical advantage of making it harder for the United Nations to reengage itself actively in efforts to settle the Kashmir dispute. India could henceforth rely on a Soviet veto to block Security Council moves which New Delhi opposed (Aquinas, et. al. 1948).

Khrushchev and Bulganin offered India economic aid as well as support on Kashmir and Goa. The Soviets agreed to build a million ton public sector steel mill financed by a \$112 million low-interest loan and to provide other economic assistance for industrial development during the Second Indian Five Year Plan, which was slated to commence in 1956. At the same time, Moscow and New Delhi expanded cultural and educational exchanges and increased trade with India.

Washington watched the Bulganin and Khrushchev visit uneasiness. Quite apart from annoyance over Pakistan's membership, Nehru regarded SEATO as “harmful to Asia as well as the cause of peace”. He commented, “ The habit of the West to carry the “white man's burden” in the East still continued, even though conditions in the world and Asia have changed greatly” (Morgenthau, 1959).

Although tough on communism at home, Nehru pursued closer relations with Communist China, as well as the Soviet Union. In the summer of 1954, China's Premier Chou En-lai visited New Delhi, where he succeeded in easing Indian worries



about Chinese policy toward Tibet. The upshot was a new Sino-Indian agreement, in which India relinquished the special privileges it inherited from the British in Tibet. The preamble contained the so-called Five Principles—in Hindi, Panch Sheel. These concepts of non-interference and mutual respect, although not in themselves new or earth-shaking, soon gained wide recognition as the articulation of the desire of Asians to shape their relationships on Asian terms rather than simply reiterating the language of Western statecraft. Nehru hoped the accord would ensure peace along the Himalayan frontiers, ushering in a long period of friendship between India and China. The era of "Hindi-Chini bhai bhai" lasted, however, only five years—until the Himalayan border dispute became a matter of public knowledge in 1959.

Dwight Eisenhower was unhappy about the downturn in Indo-US relations. Eisenhower was less antagonistic towards India .

### **Conclusion**

Indian government under premiership of Nehru put India on policy of non-alignment, presenting a neutral posture of country based of Punj Sheel, (five principles) of friend ship. Thus Nehru, despite having a good relationship with United States, criticized US policy of security alignment to protect the US interests in Asia, constituting a bulwark against Communist powers. On the other hand when Pakistan joined US- sponsored security pacts, India lashed out Pakistan act. Nehru said that Pakistan by joining this security alliance had brought Cold War controversies to South Asia. But if we explore the reasons of Pakistan's adherence towards SEATO and CENTO and other bilateral security agreements, we find that it was India that created reasons for Pakistan to join the US-sponsored security alliance. Since creation of Pakistan, India posed security threats to Pakistan. Consequently Pakistan eastern and western borders were not secured. So in such a threatened environment, a weak Pakistan which was not as much as strong to defend its borders in case of a military adventure. On eastern border, India itself had been making violent intentions and on western border, India had manipulated situation with help of government of Afghanistan that was against the creation of Pakistan and subsequently opposed the entry of Pakistan to United Nations. Thus it was obligatory for Pakistan at that time to get support of some international power to strengthen its military power. Moreover India and Afghanistan were enjoying open support from Soviet Union, a violent communist power that also had not accepted creation of Pakistan.

So these security reasons had led Pakistan to have a tilt towards western countries and that afterward was proved as a right decision of Pakistan. Pakistan was labeled as a 'most allied ally of America in Asia' and got military, economic and diplomatic support that placed Pakistan in a comparatively strong position, enabling it to face security challenges.

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